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Chapter X: Theoretical Approaches and Practical Strategies for Change Management 
Peter McGraw and Tracy Taylor 
Abstract 
 
This chapter considers the issues surrounding the management of change within sport 
organisations. Specifically, the chapter will outline some of the key characteristics and types 
of change that may be required in sport organisations in response to different change 
drivers; briefly overview some of the key academic paradigms within which change can be 
understood; and describe some key change models that may be useful to effectively 
manage change. A key component of the latter approach concerns the ways in which people 
typically react to change and the chapter considers the way that organisations can best 
facilitate the introduction of changed ways of working and overcome the resistance that is 
typically integral to peoples’ reactions. The chapter finishes with a discussion of how radical 




The ways in which people play, train, coach, manage and engage in sport are constantly 
changing. The changing nature of sport is driven by a complex array of social, economic, 
technological and political factors. Consequently, managers of sporting organisations, both 
professional and non professional, are confronted with the challenge of leading change 
initiatives whilst other members and associates of these organisations are faced with the 
rigours of the implementation of, and adaptation to, these change initiatives.  
 
As in the broader business world, the pace of change for sporting organisations has 
increased sharply in recent times. Some of the reasons for this increasing pace can be 
broadly classified into the following areas: social changes which incorporate demographic 
and cultural aspects; economic changes linked to the globalisation of markets; the rapid 
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development of new technologies (see Figure X.1); and changes in the political 
environments which organisations operate in. Changes in one area will more than likely 
stimulate changes in other areas, the interconnected nature of which is illustrated below. 
 
Insert Figure X.1 about here 
 
 
As modern society has become more commercially focused, consumer driven, and 
globalised, so has sport. The amateur, locally-based leisure pastime of sport and its 
organisation has evolved, in many instances, into a professional, highly competitive and 
lucrative industry with international exposure. Increasing globalisation and competitive 
pressures in professional sport have also led to professional sports generating substantial 
revenue through media rights, sponsorship and merchandising, which in turn leads to 
escalating salaries for players and coaches and the globalisation of the marketplace for 
talent.  
 
For professional sports the ever expanding earning power of athletes, the cult of the sport 
super star, and the rise of the player agent, greatly facilitated by an ever expanding media 
and sponsorship reach, has changed the very nature of the business of sport. Professional 
sport has spawned a myriad of associated services and large multinational sport giants such 
as Octagon and IMG are no longer just sport agents but now deal in event management, 
hospitality, league development, licensing, media distribution and sponsorship.  
 
At the community level local sports that do not have professional leagues or competitions 
have to compete with sports that have access to greater funds and sponsorship revenue. At 
the same time there has been increasing pressure on community sport organisations to 
deliver ‘professional’ services, from facilities to coaching, with limited resources; and to top it 
off there has been a worldwide decline in the numbers of citizens volunteering in sport 
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organisations. Government policy, regulations and reporting requirements have led to an 
increased bureaucratisation of sport and escalating safety requirements have meant that 
even non professional sport organisations have to develop ever widening organisational 
capabilities to manage risk and liability. 
 
A country’s political regime and approach to sport through policy and funding can also be 
major change drivers. For example, after the demise of the USSR many of the newly 
independent states were left with a sporting system that had to be completely restructured 
and reorganised. In other countries a change of government or its policy platform has meant 
either a discontinuation of funding or the requirement to meet certain targets and 
management standards to attain support. 
 
In addition to change stemming from external sources, organisations also need to manage 
change from internal sources. Internal change comes from the need to adapt and innovate 
organisational strategies, structures and processes to the changing external environment 
either in response to external change stimuli or in anticipation of them. For example, the 
introduction of web based data systems requires managers, employees and volunteers to 
learn new ways of responding to simple administrative matters such as membership 
applications, funding requests and human resource matters. 
 
In short, there are many reasons why sport organisations have to change and equally there 
are many types of organisational responses to the need for change. The stimulus for change 
may come from broad structural changes in the macro level, external social and economic 
environment but the response is always initiated at the micro level of human agency (i.e. 
how managers of sport organisations interpret the changing external environment and their 
responses to it). Such responses will vary depending on the context of the organisation as 
defined by its external and internal environment, the content of the particular change 




Types and characteristics of change 
The way that change is managed will relate to the nature of the change, its origins and 
extent to which the change impacts on the everyday activities of those involved. There are 
many different types of organisational change ranging from minor changes in systems or 
work practices that only affect a small number of people, to major shifts in the way sport 
organisations do business which require total organisational restructures. Figure X.2 
provides a schematic overview of some of the different characteristics of change with 
examples from each end of a possible spectrum of alternatives. 
 
Insert Figure x.2 here  
 
As can be seen from Figure X.2 the contours of change can vary enormously first depending 
on the mix of characteristics and issues involved in any particular change and, secondly on 
the point of focus for any particular characteristic. These are discussed in the following sub-
sections. 
 
External and Internal 
At the most fundamental level change can be regarded as inevitable and ubiquitous for all 
organisations, although the requirements and pace may vary depending on a range of 
contingencies. As discussed in the introduction to this chapter organisational change can 
result from changed external circumstances or internal adaptation and innovation. External 
factors are typically viewed to be the most powerful of the forces driving change but internal 
adaptation should also be acknowledged. Two academic perspectives are helpful in better 
understanding the relationship between external and internal change and the relationship 




First, the economic perspective outlines the core assumption that in a competitive world the 
survival of all organisations depends on their ability to respond to changing external 
competitive circumstances. The examples already given in the introduction illustrate how 
changing external circumstances require organisations to respond to large scale change in 
external environments. Second, from an organisational learning perspective organisations 
can be viewed as having an internal capability for adaption which will be higher in successful 
organisations. From this perspective change is not always directly precipitated by an 
external event but may occur in anticipation of the need to respond to external events. Thus, 
in the first instance organisational change is viewed more as a direct and largely reactive 
response to external stimulus whereas in the second it is viewed more as a proactive 
internal capability to pre-empt the need for chaotic responses. 
 
Both perspectives are useful in theorising how change occurs and clearly point to the key 
role of managers and leaders in correctly interpreting the signals of the need for change and 
responding in an appropriate and timely manner. Managers, in their role as key players in 
assessing the strengths and weaknesses of organisations and the need to respond to 
opportunities and threats, take centre stage in the change management process. 
 
Environmental Opportunities and Threats can come from many directions, such as: 
• Increasing market competition e.g. HD sport telecasts 
• Possibilities offered by new markets e.g. Soccer in Asia and Africa 
• External regulatory mandate e.g. public liability insurance 
• Pressure to conform to what other organisations are doing e.g. social media 
• Reputational risk and credibility pressures e.g. FIFA’s decision making processes in 




In anticipating and responding to environmental change by building appropriate internal 
capabilities and taking appropriate actions/decisions, managers must take account of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the organisation in areas such as: 
• Organisational learning capacity i.e. how ready is the organisation to learn new 
behavioural responses and techniques 
• Organisational capacity for change in terms of e.g. systems flexibility 
• The forces for stability and continuity and the views of key stakeholders 
• Strategic clarity (or lack of) around vision, mission and values that may prevent the 
organisation from over-responding to short term environmental turbulence  
• The balance of power between different managers and units within the organisation 
and whether there is a consensus on the need for and direction of change. 
 
Evolution and Revolution 
The scale and scope of change is another major variable influencing the impact on sport 
organisations. Evolutionary change is an incremental process whereby organisations make 
minor changes to their strategy, structure or practices over time in relatively stable external 
environments. Revolutionary change, as suggested by the name, occurs when the 
organisation engages in a monumental shift in its focus, structure or culture and changes the 
essence of the organisation. Such a dramatic change is typically driven by a need to 
respond to radically significant events in the sport organisation’s operating environment. A 
well documented example of revolutionary change can be found in the work of Slack, Kikulis 
and colleagues (cf Kikulis, Slack & Hinings, 1995: Amis, Slack & Hinings, 2002) in their 
description and analysis of the changes in Canadian national sport organisations (NSOs) in 
the 1980s when federal government funding requirements necessitated the introduction of 
systems and structures that moved the NSOs from an amateur to professional approach to 
their operations. A more recent example of a revolutionary change is evidenced in the 
complete restructuring of the Australian Soccer Association into the Football Federation of 
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Australia (FFA). This process of wide-ranging structural change was instigated following a 
Federal Government inquiry into the governance structure of the sport (Lock et al. 2009) and 
is discussed at the end of this chapter.  
Other Factors 
Change can also be viewed as planned or emergent. Much of the managerialist literature on 
change stemming back to the earliest work on the subject, presents management as 
concerned with planning, co-ordinating, controlling and implementing to ensure that intended 
changes are translated into realised changes within the organisation. From this perspective 
change is viewed primarily as a top down, non political and largely linear activity. Emergent 
change perspectives generally recognise that unforseen and unintended consequences will 
arise as change is implemented and that the final change outcome will be influenced by 
either unforseen issues or political processes driven by opponents of the planned change, 
particularly resistance from people within the organisation who will be most affected by it. 
From this perspective change can also be viewed as bottom up and political and non-linear. 
Related to the degree to which change is implemented as originally planned is the issue of 
whether the outcome of change is rational (efficiency related only) or non-rational  whereby 
change can be driven by wider political agendas of various stakeholders which often result in 
compromise positions. 
In this chapter the focus will be on change that is generally within the rational and contextual 
approaches. Rational models of organisational change suggest that change occurs through 
following a systematic program led by organisational strategists and leaders such as 
directors and managers. Contextual approaches to change differ from rational perspectives 
in that change is seen as the outcome of non-linear, multilevel and incremental processes 
that are shaped by competing group interests, organisational power and politics (Caldwell, 
2005). An insightful perspective explaining non-rational, contextual and emergent 




The underlying idea within institutional theory is that an organisation’s governance structures 
are based on rules, norms, values, and systems of cultural meaning and that decisions are 
institutionally aggregated. Historical institutionalism suggests that organisations keep 
equilibrium through the maintenance of the status quo, while sociological institutionalism 
suggests that organisations seek consolidation of institutional legitimacy in a changing 
environment (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983).  
 
Change and innovations can be introduced to improve performance in one organisation 
which are modelled on successful techniques used in other organisations. Or changes may 
be introduced to ‘keep up with the Jones’, that is, to be seen as up to date with global trends 
or by switching to what is believed to be best practice. Much of the early theorising in relation 
to institutional theory focussed on those organisations that adopted or copied the practices 
of market leaders and examined the dynamics that lead to conformity among organisations. 
These institutional researchers found that the ‘first in market’ differentiation of leading edge 
innovating organisations shifted over time to reflect homogeneity of approaches when the 
organisation entered later stages of the diffusion process. McDonald’s is frequently cited as 
a prime example of this, their business model of fast food was unique when first introduced 
but eventually, through franchising of the brand and with the emergence of a plethora of 
competitors into the marketplace, what was once a point of difference and thus an 
advantage, over time lost its edge and further eroded when consumers began to demand 
healthier, more flexible food choices. In the sport world the same points are often made 
about Nike, a business started by an athlete and coach who made a limited number of 
athlete- friendly shoes sold out of the back of co-founder Phil Knight’s car. As Nike’s 
business grew and moved beyond the track athlete to the sport shoe for everyone, so did the 
business model, the business outsourced production offshore which brought greater 




This propensity to copy or imitate successful organisations is reflected in the premise of 
isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991), which has been explained as when 
‘organisations are driven to incorporate the practices and procedures defined by prevailing 
rationalised concepts of organisational work ... organizations that do so increase their 
legitimacy and their survival prospects, independent of the immediate efficacy of the 
acquired practices and procedures’ (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 340). DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983, 1991) noted two types of isomorphism: competitive isomorphism that emerges from 
market forces, and institutional isomorphism that develops from competition for political and 
organisational legitimacy. The latter encompasses three elements: coercive, mimetic, and 
normative.  
 
Coercive pressures are the elements that push organisational procedures and structures to 
conform to best practices, influenced by the factors that the organisation is dependent on for 
resources. A pervasive coercive isomorphic pressure for all organisations is the need to 
conform to changing laws. Mimetic pressures relate to the drive to reduce uncertainty 
whereby imitating successful peer organisations is seen as a safe strategy. The whole ‘best 
practice’ movement has this principle at its heart. Normative isomorphic pressures are a 
response to professionalisation, where certain types of structure and process are viewed as 
more legitimate than others.  
 
In relation to normative isomorphic pressures, the emergence of managerialism in the 
running of sport organisations, especially in voluntary organisations has assumed 
dominance in the last two decades. While in professional and for profit sport organisations 
this focus on business acumen, target setting, performance indicators, responsibility and 
accountability has been underpinned by commercial viability drivers; in the non profit and 
community sport arena the changes have primarily been driven by government policy and 
funding.  For example, in analysing recent UK sport policy Phillpots, Grix and Quarmby 
(2010) found that the imposition of County Sport Partnerships (CSPs) with highly controlled 
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governance arrangements introduced another level of bureaucracy with tightly imposed 
targets and that ‘the use of PSAs and KPIs has strengthened Sport England’s control over 
the agencies involved in CSPs’ (p.13).  They concluded that ‘despite notions of 
decentralization, new governance arrangements for CSPs appear relatively top-down and 
managerial’ (p. 14). This finding follows on from Houlihan and Green’s (2009) evaluation of 
the impact of New Labour’s ‘modernization project’ on Sport England and UK Sport which 
they argued resulted in the objectives of both organisations being narrowed and the 
adoption of ‘business-like principles and a “command and control” regime in relationships 
with key frontline delivery partners’ (p. 678). 
 
Models of change 
There are a number of different models that explain and explore the nature of organisational 
change and how best to manage it. These typically comprise five key aspects:  
1. motivating for change, creating readiness to accept change and dealing with any 
resistance;  
2. building a shared vision to which the organisation can gain commitment;  
3. developing a support base that includes key stakeholders;  
4. managing the transition, locking in commitment; and  
5. sustaining and embedding the change through support and alignment of rewards and 
recognition (Waddell, Cummings & Worley, 2000).  
 
One of the most commonly cited change framework is Lewin’s (1951) classic change model. 
Lewin identified three stages involved in changing organisations and people, which were:  
1. establishment of the rationale and motivation to change (unfreeze);  
2. empowerment of stakeholders to embrace new ways of thinking about the 
organisation and of working (change); and  




In the first stage of change Lewin believed that the equilibrium needs to be challenged 
(unfrozen) before old behaviours are left behind (unlearnt) and new behaviours are adopted. 
In this stage the organisation should be primed to accept that change is necessary, this 
means challenging the existing way of operating.  One way to do this is to articulate how the 
change is aligned with achieving the organisation’s vision and strategy. This may be 
prefaced by a documentation of the key issues underpinning the need for change, such as 
declining club membership or sport participation figures, unsatisfactory financial 
performance, member or customer dissatisfaction, or poor on field performance results. This 
first stage may also involve challenging current organisation values, attitudes, and 
behaviours if these are likely to block change. These stimuli then create a (planned) crisis 
which in turn can facilitate the buy-in and engagement context for meaningful change. 
Stakeholder analysis and management mapping can assist with identifying and gaining the 
support of key people within the organisation for the change process. 
 
The second stage is characterised by change, as organisational staff and stakeholders start 
to reconsider the future and accept and support the new direction. This transitionary stage 
may stretch over a period of time, as those affected grapple to understand how the changes 
can benefit them. A good communication strategy is critical to keeping everyone informed 
about the changes and feeling connected to the organisation. This stage should also include 
the provision of opportunities for employee and key stakeholder involvement. 
 
The organisation enters the refreeze stage when equilibrium is reached and aspects such as 
the organisation structure are agreed upon, new roles are filled or new ways of operating 
have been fully documented. To support the change it is useful to identify actions to 
reinforce the new elements, such as implementing reward systems aligned with the 
changes, and to establish explicit feedback systems to address any barriers to sustaining the 
change. As a component of the refreezing process it is important to commemorate the 
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success of the change, reinforcing associated benefits and outcomes.  
 
Edgar Schein (1995) extended Lewin’s model by embedding a greater focus on psychology 
and group dynamics termed cognitive redefinition and depicted in Figure X.3 below: 
 
Insert Figure X.3 here 
 
In this model Stage 1 suggests that the motivation to change (unfreezing) is linked to the 
premise that past observational learning and cultural influences drive behaviour. Schein 
(1996: 27) felt that change was ‘a profound psychological dynamic process.’ Therefore, he 
suggested that new forces for change need to be introduced or some of the existing aspects 
that are perpetuating the behaviour need to be removed. Three sub-processes underpin 
readiness and motivation to change. 
1. Disconfirmation: where present conditions lead to dissatisfaction. 
2. The pressure to change creates survival anxiety- which may take several forms from 
fear of incompetence to fear of loss of personal identity or group membership. 
3. Learning anxiety associated with learning something new can trigger defensiveness 
and/or denial, scapegoating, and manoeuvring. 
 
Those involved in the change need to feel safe before they engage with the process and 
move to accept new ways of thinking and/or doing things. If the survival anxiety is greater 
than the learning anxiety or, preferably, the learning anxiety is reduced, then the unfreezing 
proceeds. The learning anxiety can be reduced by increasing psychological safety through 
training, performance coaching, support groups and other such mechanisms. 
 
In Stage 2 change is facilitated when there is adequate dissatisfaction with the current 
conditions and there is acceptance to change. The disparity between the present state and 
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that being proposed should be clear. Activities that assist in making the change include 
replication of role models and using trial-and-error learning to devise individualised solutions.  
 
To lock in the change as permanent (refreezing Stage 3) new behaviour should become 
habitual, and include developing a new self-concept and identity and instituting new 
interpersonal relationships. Refreezing seeks to provide an environment where the change is 
aligned with the changed organisational culture, policies and practices.   
 
Another way of looking at change is embodied in contextual or processual change theory 
which emerged in the 1980s as a rejection of rational, planned change. It was argued that 
the latter was too prescriptive and failed to recognise the inherent complexity of change. 
According to this perspective Pettigrew (1987) and his colleagues saw change as involving 
complex, dynamic and non-linear politically and culturally influenced processes. This 
approach also notes the importance of understanding the sequencing and pacing of different 
types of changes. The reality of change in sport organisations being complex and non-linear 
is evident in the 12 year study of change in 36 Canadian sport organisations by Amis, Slack 
and Hinings (2004). These researchers found that revolutionary change was accomplished 
by pacing the changes so that after each change the organisation had time to settle into the 
new way of doing things, establish trust and relationships and then engage in the next 
change.  
 
Another change approach is seen in the in the work of Dunphy and Stace (1990) and Stace 
and Dunphy (2001). This influential model combined internal and external factors into a 
contingency theory matrix. This model seeks to explain how organisations adjust to their 
external environments and the scale and scope of change required (from fine tuning to 
corporate transformation) via a standardised, but comprehensive, list of managerial styles 
ranging from collaborative to coercive. In total the model canvasses 16 possible styles of 
change but five main approaches are noted (see Figure X.4): 
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1. In developmental transitions there is regular change as organisations adapt to their 
external environments. Here the leadership style is most appropriately consultative 
where the leader acts to gain shared commitment from organisational stakeholders on 
the need for continual improvement. 
2. In task-focused transitions the management style is most appropriately directive with 
managers seeking compliance from organisational stakeholders about changes to 
operational requirements in certain areas. Although strongly directed from the top there 
is scope in this type of change for a more consultative approach as change is 
implemented lower down the organisation. 
3. In contrast, in charismatic transformations the need for radical transformation is led by an 
inspiring leader who can symbolically mobilise the emotional commitment of staff and in 
so doing lead the organisation in a new direction. 
4. Turnarounds are situations where organisational survival is perceived to be at stake and 
radical transformations are led by command and control oriented leaders who force 
change via coercive and directive commands with limited emphasis on employee 
engagement or commitment. 
5. The fifth category of Taylorism is associated with fine-tuning and paternalistic 
approaches to change. 
 
Each of the approaches noted above is associated with a consequent ‘path of change’ 
(Stace & Dunphy, 2001; 108-93) that takes account of the long term consequences of 
different approaches. For example, organisations that rely a lot on fine-tuning may also have 
to contemplate turnarounds or charismatic transformations at times to reinvigorate 
themselves and where charismatic transformations occur they may need to be supported 
over time by developmental or task-focused transitions to maintain momentum. In related 
empirical work Stace and Dunphy (2001) found that the most commonly used change 
processes were hybrid forms that combined directive and consultative styles although the 
exception to this was turnarounds which were more likely to be directive and/or coercive in 
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style. In addition, the empirical research suggested that the most successful organisations 
used consultative and directive change management styles and the least successful were 
more likely to use Tayloristic fine tuning. Overall, the main conclusions were that more 
effective managers and organisations tended to be comfortable using different approaches 




Insert Figure X.4 here 
 
Resistance to change 
 
Whilst it would be an overstatement to say that people always resist change, it is certainly a 
commonly reported response from people who are presented with the need to change 
without being involved in the initial decision. People tend to be resistant to change because 
they have an investment in the status quo (position, prestige, rewards, comfort level, status) 
but change, especially when imposed by others, also offers an unbalanced ‘psychological 
bargain’. In effect the change leaders are asking organisational members to trust them in 
relation to an uncertain future where many known and hard won things may be jeopardised. 
Resistance can come from a number of sources, from the requirement for new skills, 
changed norms or perceived loss of status, power or conditions. This can lead to individual 
or group feelings of frustration, insecurity or anger, and result in employee or volunteer 
turnover or regressive or aggressive behaviours. Stages in the response to change process 
have been suggested to encompass psychological reactions such as denial; resistance; 
exploration; and commitment. Also, uncertainty about the future can create fear and a 
perception of threat associated with lack of control. The most commonly asked question in 
relation to change processes is ‘what does this mean for me?’ Therefore anticipating and 
dealing with resistance is paramount and the organisation should have a communications 
plan for keeping people informed as a key part of managing change processes. 
 
Planning for change and thus minimising resistance can be tackled in a number of ways. A 
change plan should clearly state why change is needed and how it will impact groups of 
people and, at some stage, each individual. Also, change responsiveness can be facilitated 
by creating a climate of trust through supporting and involving affected staff and volunteers 
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in the change process and allowing them to have some input in the either the direction or 
implementation of change.  
 
One of the best known and influential prescriptive models of managing change to overcome 
resistance can be found in the Kotter’s Eight Step Model (See Figure X.5). This model 
emerged from Kotter’s (1995) research based observations of why change programs fail, 
which was further developed in by Kotter (1996) and Kotter and Cohen (2002).  
Insert figure X.5 here 
 
 
The Kotter model is a classic example of a top-down change management process and is 
likely to work best for change projects that are driven by the top leadership of an 
organisation. Kotter acknowledges that his somewhat linear model tends to over simplify 
what is often a more complex reality and that even successful change processes are subject 
to surprising and unforeseeable developments that can make them messy. However, Kotter 
maintains that all elements of the eight steps must be addressed and that skipping steps will 
only create the illusion of speed and progress and lead eventually to poorer results.  
In terms of management style Kotter suggests that managers follow a ‘see-feel-change’ 
pattern in which problems are presented in a way which captures the attention of 
stakeholders and taps into their feelings about the need for change at a profound level. An 
example of this is given in relation to step 1 (creating a sense of urgency) where Kotter 
recommends ‘bringing the outside in’ so that stakeholders such as employees come face to 
face directly with the nature of the external issue driving change. 
 
The major strengths of the Kotter model is that it outlines clear and well researched steps 
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which provide guidance on how to manage change, focuses on the importance of getting 
buy-in from employees, acknowledges the need to build a political consensus with key 
stakeholders and combines the need to change systems with the need to manage the 
reactions of groups and individuals impacted by change. The limitations of the model are 
that it is best suited to top-down change processes and that it does not provide room for 
participation inputs which fundamentally challenge the initial strategy. In this sense the 
genuineness of the participation mechanisms can be questioned. 
Summary and conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of some of the key issues driving change in sport 
organisations incorporating economic, demographic, technical, social and political sources. 
The chapter has outlined key characteristics and types of change that may be required in 
sport organisations in response to different change drivers and suggested that change 
management competence is a key competence for organisations adapting to rapidly 
changing environments.  
 
Key change models that are widely regarded in the academic and practitioner literature have 
been discussed and reviewed. These models provide a useful template for managers 
confronted with the need to effectively manage change, as well as recommendations to 
evaluate context related strategy choices. Some of the key components of the approaches 
discussed have concerned the ways in which people typically react to change and the way 
that sport organisations and their managers can best facilitate the introduction of changed 
ways of working to maximise benefit and to overcome the likely resistance that is often 
central to the reactions of other organisational members. In conclusion, we suggest that an 
understanding of the forces driving change and a sensitivity to the alternative approaches 
outlined in this chapter are critical for managers of modern sport organisations. Equally, well 
developed change management skills, especially those related to overcoming resistance are 
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also vital. We noted at the start of this chapter that the pace of change has increased 
dramatically in sport organisations during the last two decades. In closing we note no sign of 





A CASE OF CHANGE 
Change or die: Reforming football governance practice in Australia  
(Daniel Lock) 
Introduction 
In Australia, Association football (previously known as soccer and now simply football) has 
endured a turbulent history, marred by corruption, hooliganism, nationalistic rivalry and 
mismanagement (Crawford, 2003). Despite boasting the highest participation figures of any 
team sport in Australia (Australian Sports Commission, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006), 
football has consistently failed to attract a sufficient supporter base to lure  the sponsors and 
media coverage required for a solvent and competitive professional sporting code and 
national competition (Lock, 2009). To compound the issues with national level governance, 
Australia’s national team – The Socceroos failed to qualify for the FIFA World Cup finals 
between 1975 and 2005 and the National Soccer League (NSL) floundered, which served to 
further marginalise football from mainstream Australian sporting culture.  
 
In 2003, following increasing public pressure for change the Australian Federal Government 
intervened, commissioning a report into ‘The Structure, Governance and Management of 
Soccer in Australia’ (Crawford, 2003). This report sought to address the issue of providing a 
suitable figurehead to oversee a revolutionary change process to improve existing 
management practices of football governance in Australia. The Crawford Report instigated a 
pronounced process of change to Australian football governance. It was, as Lynch (2003: 
19) asserted, time for change ‘the game can no longer be held back by a management and 
organisational culture historically characterised by deal making, factionalism and politics.’ 
The chosen figurehead, Frank Lowy and his newly constituted board headed quickly into a 
process of organisational change, founded specifically around enacting a new and 
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meticulously prepared strategic plan. In the strategic business plan unveiled by the 
Australian Soccer Association (ASA) (2004: 2-3) (ASA) four areas of change were identified. 
These were:  
1. People and organisational culture 
2. Stakeholder management 
3. Game and core product 
4. Commercial and marketing 
 
These areas of change sought to act on clearly identified and widely agreed problems within 
football in Australia. As incoming CEO John O’Neill (2006) surmised (in his address to the 
Australian Press Club) the situation when he became incumbent: 
‘Relations with players were strained and unworkable, sponsorship and media deals flawed 
and untenable, relations between the various stakeholders were dysfunctional, and 
Australian Soccer had a somewhat justified reputation for nepotism parochialism, jingoism 
and shoddy practices, and was constantly under attack in the media.’ 
 
Change agenda 
To address the recommendations of The Crawford Report, the ASA developed a plan which 
outlined a strategy to: create a new league; improve international performances; attract 
credible corporate partners; and to reform the factionalised organisational structure of the 
ASA to better serve its stakeholders (Australian Soccer Association, 2004). For the purposes 
of this case study, the reformation of stakeholder management processes and creating a 
positive new organisational culture are the focus. The reformation of game and core product 
and development of commercial and marketing relationships are briefly covered after as they 
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were key to improving perceptions of the ASA in Australia following the changes to 
organisation structure and culture. 
 
Calls for radical changes to football in Australia were not a novelty. The Bradley Report 
outlined a blueprint for changes to football’s administrative structure in 1990. However, the 
decision making process associated with previous incarnations of football governance in 
Australia allowed individuals and clubs with vested interests to block reform (Solly, 2004). 
When the Australian Federal Government intervened in 2003 to reform football in Australia, 
they offered AU$15 million in grant and loan funding to administer the first steps of change. 
To secure this money, the recommendations of the Crawford Report were to be adopted in 
full, which circumnavigated the previous issues associated with change processes being 
blocked by bureaucracy (Solly, 2004). To initiate the process of radical changes, the ASA 
itself was required to change fundamentally. These changes are defined below. 
 
People and organisational culture 
To reform the governance structure at the ASA, it was evident that a shift in personnel was 
required. The existing board of the ASA, despite attempts to resist were removed soon after 
the Crawford Report was published (Solly, 2004). The Crawford Report identified that 
‘appropriately skilled’ individuals were required as change agents and that the current 
administration was not fit to implement the changes delegated (Crawford, 2003 : 4). Initially a 
suitable figurehead was sought to oversee the changes and remove the existing board. The 
review committee recommended Australian business tycoon and property magnate, Frank 
Lowy as a suitable figurehead to supervise the change process at the ASA. His recruitment 
was based on three factors. First, Lowy had the backing of the Federal Government to 
initiate the changes and override attempts to block the process as had been encountered 
during previous attempts for reform (Solly, 2004). Second, Lowy had global networks and 
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respect that would be vital in improving Australia’s standing within Oceania, Asia and FIFA. 
Third, Lowy was an extremely well respected businessman and capable of recruiting high 
profile administrators as appropriately skilled change agents to transform football in Australia 
(Solly, 2004). 
 
On assuming the role of Chairman, Lowy began an extensive search for a skilled 
administrative team to develop and carry through the strategic objectives outlined in the 
Crawford Report (Australian Soccer Association, 2004; Crawford, 2003). Extensive research 
was undertaken before recruiting ex-Australian Rugby Union (ARU) aficionado John O’Neill 
as CEO (Cockerill, 2004). O’Neill had a formidable record in the administration of the ARU 
having been involved in the bid for the 2003 Rugby World Cup and the day-to-day running of 
a top-level Australian sport.  In addition, the ASA’s Strategic Plan also sought to establish an 
outstanding commercial team (Australian Soccer Association, 2004). This was formed to 
introduce best practice into the ASA and to shift the organisational culture away from the 
nepotism and other dubious practices of the past (O'Neill, 2006).  
 
Moving beyond the poor practices of previous governances required considerable strategic 
planning and a thorough adherence to the recommendations of the Crawford Report. To 
introduce best governance practice at a national governance level, The Crawford Report 
required that the ASA clearly define, differentiate and separate duties of board members and 
employees (Crawford, 2003). This involved articulating a clear organisational plan to improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the ASA. In addition to the recommendations of the 
Crawford Report, the ASA’s Strategic Plan sought to develop a clear succession 
management process so the new organisational structure and culture was not reliant wholly 
on people, but sound practice, instead (Australian Soccer Association, 2004). Beyond the 
scope of the internal function of the ASA, The Crawford Report was specific that 
24 
 
relationships with stakeholders in Australia and internationally should be improved. This 
facet of change is discussed here. 
 
Stakeholder management 
Two key weaknesses in current stakeholder management practices were identified in the 
Crawford Report and targeted in the ASA’s strategic plan (Australian Soccer Association, 
2004). These were the need to improve relationships and management of state based 
organisations and to develop relationships with international stakeholders at continental and 
global levels (Australian Soccer Association, 2004). 
 
Firstly, the Crawford review committee presented findings showing that the ASA did not have 
the support of the majority of its domestic stakeholders, including state and local football 
associations (Crawford, 2003; Solly, 2004). John O’Neill (2006) articulated the problems this 
caused: ‘for too long, this sport [football] has been fractured with local committees, mostly 
with the best of intentions, developing their own regulations.’ Therefore, there was no 
consistency of delivery from the national governing body through to the state and local 
football associations (Crawford, 2003). Delivery was determined at state and local levels, 
which was ad-hoc and reliant on the expertise of individuals present in localities, which is not 
a sound management framework.  
 
The Crawford Report recommended that the ASA develop a coherent strategy for national, 
state and local delivery and management of football and that all state and local associations 
should be members of the national governing body (Crawford, 2003). The ASA Strategic 
Plan acted on this recommendation by introducing service contracts between the ASA and 
each state and territory of Australia (Australian Soccer Association, 2004). A specific point of 
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strategic change was to ‘ensure that state members’ administration and football structures 
mirror those of the ASA’ (Australian Soccer Association 2004: 25).  By ensuring that each 
state and local association shared a common purpose with the ASA and had a similar 
organisational structure, O’Neill (2006) hoped that ‘new national regulations would provide 
the framework for all clubs and districts to administer the game correctly.’ By correctly, 
O’Neill was referring to states and localities delivering football based on best practice 
observed from around the globe and disseminated by the ASA.  
 
Secondly, the ASA set out to develop a more prominent relationship with international 
football stakeholders: namely FIFA and the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) (Australian 
Soccer Association, 2004). Both attempts to develop international stakeholder relationships 
were conceived to promote Australia’s marginalised position in the administration of football 
globally (Australian Soccer Association, 2004). Strategic conversations with the AFC were 
used to generate a potential shift into the AFC from the Oceanic Football Confederation 
(OFC). Shifting to the AFC was preferential for two reasons: One, the AFC provided a far 
more powerful, influential and organised confederation within FIFA’s structure. Two, the OFC 
included minimal competitive fixtures, which were played against weak opposition, which 
failed to garner public attention. The AFC offered four or five places (dependent on the host) 
to the OFC’s one in the FIFA World Cup qualifying procedure and the potential for 
participation in the Asian Cup (International) and the Asian Champions League (Club), which 
offered a renewed international appeal for the ASA and an increase in the number of high 
profile competitive fixtures hosted in Australia (Australian Soccer Association, 2004). The 
broader impact of the changes to governance structure and stakeholder management 
practices is discussed here. 
 
The immediate impact of change 
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The change processes described during this case study created a period of considerable 
success for football in Australia between 2005-2006. The ASA was renamed the Football 
Federation Australia in 2004 (FFA), to create a clean break from “old soccer”, thus launching 
“new football” to tap into the global nature of the sport (Cockerill, 2005). In 2005, the A-
League was launched and the Socceroos qualified for the FIFA World Cup. 2006 saw 
Australia join the AFC, which gave the Socceroos access to an improved pathway to FIFA 
World Cup qualification and the Asian Cup and all A-League teams the opportunity to qualify 
for the Asian Champions League (Football Federation Australia, 2010a).  Additionally, it 
provided Australia with a far stronger standing within the FIFA structure and an opportunity 
to develop better networks with international stakeholders. In 2010 the Socceroos again 
participated in the FIFA World Cup. 
 
Off the field, the FFA secured a media-rights deal with FOX Sports Television to broadcast 
A-League and international matches exclusively on Pay-Television (which was renegotiated 
shortly before the FIFA World Cup in 2006 for a significant increase in value). Additionally 
the FFA attracted the support of high-profile corporate sponsors including Hyundai, Qantas, 
Optus, Nike, Solo, Westfield and NAB (Football Federation Australia, 2010b). The accrual of 
a significant group of corporate sponsors was aided by the FFA’s decision to join the AFC as 
it provided corporate partners with access to the lucrative Asian business market through 
support of an Australian sport. 
 
Notwithstanding the on and off field success the management of stakeholders at a State and 
local level has continued to trouble the FFA. The culture of mismanagement that preceded 
2004 led to State organisations holding considerable autonomy, which they have fought hard 
to maintain. Slowly the FFA has been able to pull the organisations into their structure: First 
through the changing of their titles to reflect “football” not “soccer”; Second through each 
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State and territory becoming a member of the FFA, as stipulated in the Crawford Report 
(2003) and ASA Strategic Plan (Australian Soccer Association, 2004). This process has 
been arduous, with some State associations resisting membership until as recently as 2010.  
 
Despite the radical changes that were implemented from 2004-2006, the process of change 
has not been straightforward since. The FFA has endured a revolving door of staff 
maintenance, with John O’Neill and the majority of the commercial team departing soon after 
the FIFA 2006 World Cup in Germany. Although Frank Lowy remains as Chairman of the 
FFA, the turnover of staff has tested the succession planning processes (Australian Soccer 
Association, 2004). Lowy has continued to oversee the recruitment of a high profile 
commercial team and CEO, but football has undoubtedly entered a period of consolidation 
since 2006.  
 
Linking the case to Key Chapter Concepts. 
The FFA case illustrates many of the concepts discussed in the body of the chapter and 
provides a vivid illustration of large scale, managerially led change in an important sporting 
organisation. 
In relation to the types of change discussed in Figure X.2 and the associated commentary, 
the FFA case is a clear example of organisational change that is ‘root and branch’ in scale 
and scope. The drivers for change in the FFA case were a widespread recognition that the 
pre change administrative structures and processes were flawed beyond redemption and 
required a transformational turnaround led by a new and powerful management team with a 
clear mandate. Clearly, the key engine of the reform was economic with government funding 
being conditional on the implementation of new structures and new TV and commercial 
contracts supporting the rationale for the revised operations once established. Although the 
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change had an overt and highly public political agenda to improve Australian football and rid 
it of “shoddy practices”, once under way the language of change was primarily concerned 
with professionalism, administrative efficiency, implementing globally accepted managerial 
systems and becoming economically self sustaining by providing a high quality and attractive 
product. Additionally the change process in the FFA case was linear in that it was managed 
over time in accordance with a clearly envisioned set of goals and outcomes and not allowed 
to deviate from these, it was long run (and continues at the time of writing), and involved 
many factors traversing the spectrum of macro related systems and structures and micro 
aspects relating to the way individuals were expected to behave. 
The management approach in the FFA case is an interesting illustration of the managerial 
actions required to overcome resistance as espoused by Kotter (1995). A sense of urgency 
was created by the economic incentives on for successful change and a clear articulation of 
the opportunity cost of continuing without reform. A powerful guiding coalition was 
established to oversee the change starting at the board level and continuing with the 
appointment of a new CEO and new managerial team. The vision for the new organisation 
was articulated very strongly and communicated consistently as a reference point during the 
long-term change implementation process as a way of overcoming resistance along the way. 
Short-term wins to show that change was working were delivered through the success of the 
A League and the national team in qualifying twice for the FIFA World Cups of 2006 and 
2010. Lastly momentum was maintained through the introduction of new managerial 
systems and the longer-term establishment of a different culture for FFA. 
 
Summary 
This case has outlined both the necessity for change and the strategic planning processes 
that underpinned the reformation of football in Australia. Although the governance of football 
has developed markedly since 2003, the sport still faces significant challenges as it 
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continues to overcome the mismanagement of previous governance. The future of football in 
Australia has been given a lifeline by the Australian Federal Government’s intervention; 
however, the process of change is incomplete and will provide an ongoing challenge to the 
management team at the FFA to satisfy the needs of those domestic stakeholders that are 
responsible for ensuring the coherent and best practice delivery and management that is 
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Figure X.1: New technologies – a changing sport landscape 
Sport organisations worldwide continually grapple with a myriad of new technologies that 
seem to emerge on a daily basis. One technology that has been embraced almost 
universally is what is generically termed ‘new media’, that is the development of interactive 
websites, streaming audio and video, chat rooms, online communities, web advertising, and 
virtual reality environments among others (Santomier & Shuart, 2008).   
 
YouTube is increasingly used by sports governing bodies, clubs and fans to distribute 
audiovisual coverage of sporting events. The National Hockey League (NHL) in the North 
America was one of the first governing bodies of sport to launch its own YouTube channel in 
2006. This enabled the NHL to bypass traditional television outlets, open up other revenue 
streams through advertising and subscription and get direct editorial control how the sport is 
produced (Boyle & Haynes, 2009). In 2007, this model was followed by Chelsea Football 
Club, which launched their own YouTube channel to showcase news and interviews with 
players and the manager.  
 
Another example is technology-based ticketing systems that have been introduced by all 
major sport stadia around the globe. The technologies most commonly used are magnetic 
stripes tickets/cards, electronic tickets via Internet, smart cards and mobile ticketing 
systems. Most systems are a cheaper and more effective way to handle ticket sales for 
organisations and allow 24/7 purchasing, last minute discounts and other benefits. These 
systems have radically changed the way stadia and sport organisations operate. Currently 
ticketing is often outsourced to ticket seller and distributer companies, such as Ticketed and 





New technologies are now prominent in the development of sports equipment and clothing. 
This is a challenge for many sport organisations that must continuously adapt competition 
rules and policies. A recent example that caused much public attention and challenged all 
parties involved was the revolutionary Arena swimsuits used at the 2009 World Swimming 
Championships in Rome, where dozens of records were broken due to the use of the new 
material polyurethane (a form of plastic). The suits were consequentially banned on the 
grounds that they artificially enhanced performance (Ross, 2010). As this example 
illustrates, the introduction of new technology forces sport organisations to constantly adapt 
to technological developments. 
 
Modern technologies have changed the world of sport. Technological developments and 
innovations not only create opportunities for new organisations to enter the market place but 
create whole new markets - such as new sports (Boyle & Haynes, 2009).  Also, modern 
technologies have changed the structure of organisations (Slack & Parent, 2006), the way 
they operate and their inter-organisational relationship (for example in between sport 
producer and sport broadcaster). On the one hand, sports organisations have become more 
regulated and interdependent as is shown by the symbiotic relationship between sport and 
the media (Lange, Nicholson & Hess, 2007; Turner & Shilbury, 2010). On the other hand, 
modern technologies make organisations more independent and self-regulated as new 
communication channels such as the Internet enable them to communicate directly with 
fans, participants and others (Hutchins, 2008; Webb, 2007).  
 
Many sports organisations have become highly professional as they embrace new 
technologies (Webb, 2007). Whether these imply more benefits than costs for an 
organisation depends on many factors. With the right skills and knowledge, sport 
organisations can definitely benefit from modern technologies in many ways such as through 
a more efficient operation or more communication channels that reach out internationally 
(Slack & Parent, 2006; Santomier & Shuart, 2008; Kriemadis, Terzoudis & Kartakoullis, 
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2010) or other business-generating opportunities (Webb, 2007). However, modern 
technologies often imply additional costs as they can be very expensive and qualified staff 
are needed (Santomier & Shuart, 2008; Slack & Parent, 2006). Therefore, it is often a 
challenge for sports organisations to embrace modern technologies, especially when 
resources are scarce (Santomier & Shuart, 2008).  
 
The rapid development of technologies in sport also forces sport organisations and clubs to 
acquire more high-tech and sophisticated training and athlete development methods in order 
to stay competitive. This often implies high costs but opens up new avenues of revenue as 
athletes can be better developed and assessed (Chadwick, 2009). Regardless of the nature 
of innovations, sports organisations must seek to quickly adapt to modern technologies to 







Figure 2. A schematic overview of different change issues  
Characteristic/Issue Alternatives from each end of spectrum  
Stimulus External Internal 
Scale and Scope Revolutionary Evolutionary 
Strategy and Timing Planned Emergent 
Language Rational Non - rational 
Drivers/Leaders Top Down Bottom Up 
Environmental Determinants 
and Duration 
Equilibrium (Single issue and 
non continuous) 
Non Equilibrium (Continuous 
change and multiple issues) 
Power and resources Non political e.g. improving 
internal efficiency 




resource allocations etc. 
Direction Linear Non Linear 
Emphasis Macro - organisational 
strategy/structure/systems 
and processes 
Micro – behavioural change 



























Figure 4: The Dunphy and Stace Change matrix 
Style of change                
   Management  
  Fine tuning Incremental   Modular  Corporate 












Source: Stace & Dunphy, 2001: 109 
Figure X 5:Kotter’s 8 Step Model 
1. Establishing a Sense of Urgency: Examining market and competitive realities, 















2. Forming a Powerful Guiding Coalition: Assembling a group with enough power to 
lead the change effort. Encouraging the group to work together as a team. 
3. Creating a Vision: Developing strategies for achieving that vision. Creating a vision to 
help direct the change effort. 
4. Communicating the Vision: Using every vehicle possible to communicate the new 
vision and strategies. Teaching new behaviours by the example of the guiding 
coalition. 
5. Empowering Others to Act on the Vision: Getting rid of obstacles to change Changing 
systems or structures that seriously undermine the vision.  Encouraging risk taking 
and non-traditional ideas, activities and actions. 
6. Planning for and Creating Short-Term Wins: Planning for visible performance 
improvements.  Creating those improvements. Recognising and rewarding 
employees involved in the improvement 
7. Maintain focus and momentum. Beware of declaring victory too early and recognise 
that fundamental change requires a long time before new behaviours become 
embedded. 
8. Institutionalising New Approaches: Articulating the connections between the new 
behaviours and corporate success. Developing the means to ensure leadership 
development and succession. 
 
 
